Northern Ireland’s £700million Infrastructure Disaster
Where the money went
Between 2011 and 2019, £10.6 billion have been spent on infrastructure projects, estimated to reach £14.8 billion by 2021. As of right now, these infrastructure projects have cost the Northern Irish public around £700 million more than was originally planned. There are seven major ‘flagship’ projects which the executive highlighted in 2015 as being high priority to see completed but which have coincidentally been some of the most poorly managed projects in the last decade. Each one of those seven projects has come into multiple issues which were not anticipated by the governmental departments in charge of the and have led to the delays and overspending. Those seven projects are:
-the A5 (delayed by 10 years, to be finished by 2028 and potential £300 million overspend)
-the A6 (no known end date and under budget as of now)
-Belfast rapid transit (minor delays and slight underspend)
-Belfast Transport hub (minor delays, due for 2025 and £18 million overspend)
-Mother and Children’s Hospital (6 year delay and £148 million overspend)
-Regional and sub-regional stadia (delay dependent on stadia and £32 million combined overspend)
-Desertcreat college (3 years delay and £1.6 million)
Including the above seven, the noticeable figure of £700 million (more accurately £697 million) comes from only eleven infrastructure projects taken on by the NI executive. Meaning that figure does not include the additional projects currently underway not taken into account in the NIAO’s report.
Who was at fault
There are two departments who can be primarily blamed, the Department for Infrastructure and the Department of Health, both took on the largest number of projects over the past ten years. The Department for Infrastructure took on 17 projects from 2011 to 2019 while the Department of Health took on 16 in the same timeframe (the next closest being the Department for Economy with 8).
The list of Ministers for the department for Infrastructure over that time were:
2011-15: Danny Kennedy (UUP)
2015-16: Michelle McIlveen (DUP)
2016-17: Chris Hazzard (Sinn Fein)
2020: Nichola Mallon (SDLP)
While the list of Ministers for the Department of Health over that time were:
2011-14: Edwin Poots (DUP)
2014-15: Jim Wells (DUP)
2015-16: Simon Hamilton (DUP)
2016-17: Michelle O’Neill (Sinn Fein)
2020: Robin Swann (UUP)
However, solely blaming Ministers would be slightly reductive and far too easy. One of the real issues for the overspend was the civil service, along with the procedure used and the large bureaucracy which is in place. Not forgetting the classic case of Northern Irish governmental incompetence.
The Issues
A number of institutions have created a list of issues repeated over multiple projects explaining why these endeavours have been so disastrous. One of which has been the procurement procedures within governmental departments. The NIAO’s report paints a picture of department’s who do not have a consistent plan of action when looking at obtaining construction companies for infrastructure work. This is “despite there being areas of good practice and effective delivery within the commissioning and delivery system and despite the best efforts of able and hardworking staff, the system as a whole is not fit for purpose and works against … [the] best endeavours to deliver”. Clearly the resources and knowledge are widely available but the issue is the successful use of the existing strengths. It appears that on too many occasions the department for Infrastructure used multiple differing avenues inconsistently to give out high priced government contracts to an industry ready to profit off of governmental incompetence.
There is also an issue with the planning of infrastructure projects within Stormont and the civil service. Too many of the projects faced legal issues which unnecessarily drove up the prices when a plan could have been better laid out well before even commissioning the project to be started. Somehow, it appears that there is either no process in government for foreseeing these legal issues or those processes have been ignored when taking on these projects. Additionally, nearly all projects ran into funding issues and a decent amount also ran into design changes and had to change the scope of constructions. This is not a case of unlucky coincidence but a continued incompetence on the part of the government to accurately foresee the challenges which will face them when tackling these multi-million pound affairs. According to the NIOA’s accounts, 9 of the 11 projects contributing to the £700 million overspend were not budgeted correctly in the first place leading to funding issues.
While many of the projects appear to be necessary additions to Northern Ireland’s infrastructure, why are they all taking place at the same time when we are not a productive economy who can sustain such spending. As the report points out on multiple occasions, there needs to be better prioritisation on which projects are more important than others. Departments, ministers and the executive must have known at some point that these projects were piling up but they continued to commence on new work without finishing the old existing ventures.
Looking back at the ministerial changes will also illuminate a possible issue and a contributing factor to the previous point made. Does the continuous rotation of government ministers really create a conducive environment for effective work. Looking at the above list of ministers, it has to be questioned whether there are actually any similarities between those chosen or if they are simply thrown into circumstances which leave them having to play with the previously established sunk-costs fallacy.
The solutions
The solutions which will be laid out below obviously have the benefit of hindsight on their side so it should not be presented that these solutions were evident before 2011 however they will be necessary in the future if we do not want to see a repeat. The CBI gave a brilliant recommendation to follow Scotland and the Republic in creating a centralised procurement model which will congregate the existing knowledge and skills already available into one place for departments to dip into. Hopefully this will clear up procurement issues. This would also allow for a decluttering of bureaucracy which exists around this process.
The planning stage of construction also needs greater clarity. Tackling possible legal issues before they become as issues is essential, creating more clear objectives and goals with projects should also be a priority. Ensuring that the resources exist before making commitments is highly important to making sure that many of the existing issues do not crop up in the future. Realistically, there needs to be a period where no new infrastructure projects are taken on until the previously mismanaged ones have been dealt with properly.
Finally, Better and more consistent ministerial leadership would be the final recommendation. While this is not always possible within an unstable government, there remains a need for some form of follow through even when a minister leaves and is replaced by a new face. Even in that scenario, there are steps that can be taken within the civil service’s leadership that could better help the transition between ministers.
Conclusion
Luckily, due to an in-depth report by the Northern Irish Auditing Office, these recommendations are already being discussed in the corridors of power. Only a few days ago, there was an internal inquiry into the overspend with some decent progress being made in the meeting. Yet, with this disaster, RHI and the wind turbine subsidies, the Northern Irish government is quickly setting a precedent of incompetence in dealing with any complex matters on their own. A question will need to be asked if the current institutions are working effectively enough to warrant their continued existence and the answers may not be optimistic. While it is easy to criticise politicians as they have faces, on this occasion the civil service and its functions are just as culpable.
